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THE STANDARD OIL FINE.
UGUST 3, 1907, JUDGE LANDIS, in the United States 
District
Court, for the Northern District of Illinois, sentenced the
Standard Oil Co. to pay the largest fine ever inflicted upon any off en-
der.' The suit was an indictment on 1,903 counts for violations 
of
the Elkins Rebate Law in receiving concessions on the movement 
of
1,903 cars of oil from Whiting, Indiana, to East St. 
Louis, Illinois,
and from Chappell, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri, during 
the
eighteen months between September I, i9o3, and March 1, i9o5.
Four hundred and forty-one counts were withdrawn as not neces-
sarily involved in this case. The plea was "Not Guilty." The
verdict was "Guilty" on all the 1,462 remaining counts. The fine
imposed was the maximum on each count-$20,000, or a total 
of
$29,240,000.
The Act provides that it shall be unlawful: "To offer, grant 
or
give, or to solicit, accept or receive any rebate, concession 
or
discrimination" in the interstate transportation of any property
whereby it shall, "by any device whatever, be transported at a less
rate than that named in the tariffs published and filed" with the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Whoever gives or receives
"any such rebates, concessions or discriminations * * * shall
be punished by a fine of not less than $i,ooo nor more than $20,000."
The defendant operates an oil refinery at Whiting, Indiana. A
terminal railroad company operates a belt line from Whiting across
the state line into Illinois and around the city of Chicago. The
Chicago and Alton railroad company operates a railroad 
from
Chicago to East St. Louis, Illinois. It crosses the belt 
line at
Chappell, Illinois, near Chicago. From East St. Louis, Illinois,
there are three terminal roads that cross the river to St. Louis,
Missouri. Four other companies-the Wabash, I. C. R. R., C. B.
& Q., and C. & E. I,-operate between Chicago and East St. Louis.
For several years rates between these places have been fixed by
the Chicago-St. Louis Traffic Association, which issues tariffs, 
to
which all these lines are parties, and each company files the' i, under
its own numbers, with the Commerce Commission. May 15, 1899,
one of these tariffs, naming rates on classified articles, and special
rates on particular commodities, designated Class Tariff No. 24, was
filed with the Commission; no special oil rate was mentioned, 
and
no duly published exception of oil was made. Oil would then, under
the classification then in use in this territory, take the fifth class rate
of i8c per one hundred pounds from Chicago to East St. Louis. The
I United States v. Standard Oil Company of Indiana, 155 Fed. Rep. 305.
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Alton was a party to this tariff, and had filed it with the Commission.
It had also filed a joint-tariff with the belt line, referring to this
Class Tariff No. 24, and providing that the rate shall be the samefrom Whiting, Indiana, to -East St. Louis, Illinois, as from Chicago
to East St. Louis; also schedules of the terminal roads, fixing a rate
of iy2c-per ioo pounds from East St. Louis to St. Louis; all these
were filed by the Alton, in its own name, distributed to its agents,and fixed a rate over the whole route; it accepted property at
Whiting, delivered it at St. Louis, was paid in full therefor, andsettled with the terminal companies at both ends of the line, for theirshare of the revenue; they had no dealings, whatever, with the
defendant.
Shipments were made from Whiting, Indiana, over the belt line to
Chappell, thence over the Alton to East St. Louis, and over theterminals to St. Louis, for which the defendant paid the Alton6c per ioo pounds to East St. Louis, and 7Yc to St. Louis, instead
of the i8c or I9y2c filed and published rate,-and the Alton paidout of this 6c, or 6y2c, the switching charges to the terminal
companies.
Payment was not made to the Alton local agent at Chappell in theusual way, as in other cases, as the oil -was shipped. This agent
way-billed the oil at 18c prior to 1903, at ioc from 1903 to May,i9o4, and at 18c from June, 19o4, to June, i9o5.; he calculated andentered on the bill the freight charges at such rate on each car, and
marked the freight "prepaid" and charged himself therewith. Inorder to balance this false billing, he was instructed, falsely, to
credit himself with an equal amount as "Advances paid on freight
forwarded," as if he had forwarded to connecting lines their share
of the charges on through shipments. The charges were actuallycollected semi-monthly at- the 6c rate, on collection bills sent by the
auditor of the Alton to the defendant; some of these were accom-panied by abstracts showing that the oil had been way-billed by the
agent at a ioc or 18c rate.2
The defences were: i. As justifying and excusing the 6c rate,the defendant applied, through its traffic manager, in December,
1902-3-4, to the chief rate clerk in the general freight office of theAlton, for rates on oil from Whiting to East St. Louis, and eachtime was given a "special billing order," making a rate of 6c on oilfor one year each time, collections to be made through the auditor's
office; he also then received an "application sheet" applying the
'Part of the details of the above statement is taken from Mr. Garfield's Report onPetroleum Transportation, pp. 327, 333, 336. They were obtained from the officers and
records of the railroad company.
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Chicago-East St. Louis rates to Whiting; and upon inquiry was told
that the rate had been filed with the Commerce Commission.
Defendant claimed that it was thereby misled into the honest belief
that the 6c rate was the lawful one, and in reliance thereon made
payments at such rate. The special billing order did not purport to
be filed, was not filed, and was not distributed to any freight agent
for use in quoting rates to the public, but a copy of it was kept in
the tariffs filed in the general freight office. The application sheet,
though filed in 1903, did not refer to any special billing order, or
any state tariff (see below), but did refer to the Class Tariff No.
24, fixing the I8c rate. While the admissibility 
of the defendant's
evidence that it had been misled was being argued, the court asked
the defendant's counsel if its traffic manager was, in fact, so misled;
the manager was then in court, and after consultation, counsel
answered for him that "he assumed the Alton did its legal duty in
that regard;" the court ruled that "it was the defendant's duty to
make diligent endeavor, in good faith, to ascertain at the carrier's
office whether the rate had been so filed, and was chargeable with
such knowledge as this would have disclosed ;" the traffic manager
was then called and testified that he had, on three occasions, inquired
of and been informed by the rate clerk, that the rate had been 
duly
filed. The jury was directed to subject the testimony of the clerk
and traffic manager "to very careful scrutiny." The jury, having
found the defendant guilty, must have concluded that its traffic
manager did not make a good faith effort to ascertain the facts, 
or
was not, in fact, misled by what was told him. As pointed out below
this seems to be the correct conclusion.
2. The Elkins law is unconstitutional, because: (i) The defendant
has a natural, inherent right to make a private contract for a
railroad rate, and this law deprives it of this liberty without due
process of law; to which the judge answered that he knew of nothing
to support this view but the eminence of the counsel advancing it;
and, besides, a railroad company, being a public functionary with
the power of eminent domain, is fundamentally incompetent to
contract in ways specifically declared contrary to the public welfare
of all. This certainly is the well settled doctrine 
in this country.
3
(2) The law delegated to the carrier legislative power in author-
izing it to fix rates; to which the court answered that the Supreme
Court had many times ruled otherwise as to rates fixed by state
"3Atcheson v. Denver Railroad, zio U. S. 667; Interstate Commerce Com. v. Cincin.
nati, etc., R. R., 167 U. S. 47; Tift-v. Southern Railroad, 123 
Fed. Rep. 789; Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U. S. 466; Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197.
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commissions.' (3) The law gives the Comherce Commission
power to pass ultimately upon the reasonableness of rates fixed by
carriers, and thereby deprives the courts of their jurisdiction in the
matter; the court answers that the law does not purport to do any
such thing. (4) The commerce clause of the Constituion does
not authorize Congress to forbid and-make criminal the acceptance
of a rate less than the published one; the court answers that this
simply involves the power of Congress to say that railroad rates
shall be uniform, and says, further, that it is settled that Congress
has such power, and can enforce uniformity by penalties.
3. The Alton's haul from Chappe.l to East St. Louis is not inter-
state commerce. To this the court answered that the test is whether
the commodity to be moved is to pass on a continuous journey from
one state to another; and when it begins thus .to move, interstate
commerce has begun and continues to its destination, and any carrier
participating in this movement is engaged in inter-state commerce
even -if its line is within only one state or county. The evidence,--
joint agency at Chappell, joint tariffs over the terminal roads, pay-
ment of the terminal companies by the Alton, and the actual move-
ment of the oil in a continuous passage from Whiting to East St.
Louis, or St. Louis, under an agreement made with the Alton only,-
plainly showed that the Alton was carrying on this traffic as inter-
state traffic.
This is in accord with the early holding of the Supreme Court in
The Daniel Bal,5 and which has been followed ever since.
6-
4: Defendant offered and claimed the right to show that during
the period covered by the indictment there was a lawfully published
rate of 6y4c (claimed to be equal, because of certain. switching
charges, to the Alton's 6c rate) over the C. & E. I. road from
Whiting to East St. Louis. This was offered to show there was
no motive to ship over the Alton and violate the law, when ship-
ments could have been as easily made over the C. & E. I. at an
equal lawful rate. The -court ruled: "Motive.is not material where
the proof is clear that it was the defendant who committed the
crime" upon the question of guilt -or innocence, and excluded the
evidence on this point, relying upon Schmindt v. U. S.,
T which sus-
tains this view.
See Railroad Commission Cases, ix6 U. S. 307, et seq.: Louisville and Nashville
R. Co. v. Brown, 123 Fed. Rep. 946.
io Wall. 557.
coe v. Errol, xz6 U. S. 5x7; Cincinnati Ry. v. Interstate Com. C., 162 U. S. 184;
Interstate Stock Yards v. Indianapolis Ry., 99 Fed, Rep. 472; Kelly v. Rhoads, 188
U. S. 1.
1133 Fed:, 257, on 263. A similar rule is laid down in Stone v. State, io5 Ala. 6o;
Marcum v. Commw. (Ky.), i S. W. Rep. 727; State v. David, 131 Mo. 38o, on 397;
People v. Feigenbaum, x48 N. Y. 636.
r21
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The rule is also stated in a recent authority thus: "The existence
or non existence of motive is immaterial, where the guilt of the
accused is clearly established."
The court, however, also ruled that if it should later appear that
there was such a lawful rate in force, it would be admitted apd
considered in mitigation of the penalty; and after the verdict of
"guilty," directed that such evidence be produced. This showed
that in September, 1895, the C. & E. I. (with other companies) filed
a joint class tariff No. 7986, fixing an i8c rate on oil from Chicago
to St. Louis; in October, 1895, the same company filed a commodity
tariff No. 8o73, fixing a 6y4c rate on oil from Dolton, Illinois (the
C. & E. I. crossinig of the belt line from Whiting), stating that
a switching charge of $3.oo would be absorbed on shipments from
Whiting. On July 6, 1903, this company filed- class tariff No.
17679, saying that Chicago rat~s should apply (with certain specified
exceptions not including oil) between Chicago suburban stations
(including Dolton and Whiting) and East St., Louis, and referred
particularly to the tariff No. 7986, fixing an I8c oil rate, and the
Chicago-St. Louis Traffic Ass'n tariff No. 24, of 1899, above men-
tioned, likewise fixing an i8c rate. This tariff No. 17679, thus
indicating an 18c rate to the public, was filed with the Commission
and distributed to all the C. & E. I. agents. It was not, however,
included in the schedules offered in evidence by the defendant to
show .the existence of the 6y4c rate over that road. July 7, 1903,
the C. & E. I., recognizing that tariff No. 17679 nullified the 6j 4 c
Dolton-Eaft St. Louis rate of tariff No. 8o73, issued amendment" No.
i to tariff No. 7986 above, purporting to cancel the 6y4c oil rate of
tariff No. 8o73, and named a commodity rate of 6 c on oil from
Chicago and Dolton to East St. Louis; this was not filed until March,
19o6, one year after the period covered by the indictment. On
these facts, the court held that the situation on the C. & E. I. neither
excused nor palliated the defendant's acceptance of the known
unlawful 6c Alton rate.
It appears 4rom the foregoing that it is doubtful if the tender
of evidence to show a lawful 6y4c rate on the C. & E. I., was made
in good faith, when the latest tariff filed, showing otherwise, was
withheld. If the defendant's evidence had been admitted, it would
have permitted the government to show the truth,--and that was
contrary to the defendant's claim. It could not then be prejudiced
by the exclusion of this evidence.
5. Prosecution can be for only one offence, under the law;
x,462 cars were shipped; 3 different yearly contracts were made;
a 12 Cyc. 149.
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36 bills were presented and paid by the defendant; but the number of
cars in each order or shipment was not shown. The defendant
claimed there could be a penalty for one count.only, or for three con-
tracts only, or, at most, for 36 payments made, or not at all, unless
the number of different shipments was shown. The court, citing no
cases, held the law was violated every time any property is trans-
ported contrary to the act; there is nothing to show Congress
intended that if a defendant shall offend habitually he shall have
immunity save only as to one violation. Such a rule would encQur-
age one who violates the law once to disobey it by wholesale, in
order to swell his purse after paying a single fine. The legal rate
was on a car lot basis; the unlawful 6c rate. was made and accepted
on the same basis; the bills were rendered and paid at that rate per
car, each car being specifically itemized. Neither party offertd any
evidence as to the number of separate shipments. These circum-
stances, the court says, justify a finding of "guilty" on each count
for the shipment of each car.
This view of the court is sustained by several well considered
cases,9 though there are some exceptions."0
6. The offense was wholly technical,-no one has been injured
because there was no other shipper of oil. The court answers: It
is novel for a convicted defendant to urge the complete triumph of
a dishonest course as a reason why he should go unpunished. Of
course, there was no other shipper of oil, nor could there be so long
as the Standard could ship for one-third of what any one else would
have to pay. To the extent the defendant has not paid, other
shippers have had to pay; so, too, common honesty among men
ought not to be altogether ignored; the execution of such a commer-
cial- policy involves the contamination of subordinate officers and
employes, even looking to the time when the testimony will be
required to protect the offender from its violation 6f the law. "The
men who thus deliberately violate the law wound society more deeply
than does he who counterfeits the coin or steals letters from the
mail."
The Elkins law was designed to meet just this situation. The
Interstate Commerce law made unlawful discriminations of the kind
in existence at Whiting for many years, but made no provision for
punishing the sinning shipper, but only the offending carrier.
7 For the guidance of the court in ficing the penalty, it asked
9O'Neil v. Vermont, s8 Vt. 140 (liquor seller convicted of 307 offenses, fined. $20
each, and sent to rison for '199T4 days in default of payment; s. c. r44 U. S. 323;
Southern Express C. v. Walker, 92 Va. 59, 41 L. R. A. 436; State v. Baker, io5 La.
373; Bliss v. U. S. soS Fed. Rep. So8; and see note 35 L. R. A. s6r.
1 In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274; State v. Whitaker, 48 La. Ann. 527.
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information concerning the ownership of the capital stock of the
Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, and the earnings of such holding
company. 'Defendant's counsel refused to give this; subpoenas
were then issued for the officers of the Standard Oil Co. of Indiana
and of- New Jersey. Counsel requested that these be recalled, and
a subpoena issued to a single subordinate official, who, it was said,
had and could give the desired information; the court then asked if
he would answer, and was informed he might decline on advice of
counsel; the court then ordered subpoenas to be served, and they
Were. The testimony showed that the Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey owned all but four $ioo shares of the $I,ooo,ooo capital stock
of the Indiana company; that the capital stock of the New Jersey
company was about $Ioooooooo; that its net earnings for the
period covered by the indictment were about $2oo,ooo,ooo, and the
annual dividends declared were about 4o, or $4oooo,ooo. The
enforced attendance and testimony were resisted as extra judicial
and unwarranted; but the court relied upon the clearly expressed
rule in BISHOP'S NEw CRIMINAL LAW, Vol. I, §§ 948-50 to the
contrary. The court says the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey "is
the real defendant, for the reason that if a body of men organized
a large corp6ration under the laws of one state for the purpose of
carrying on business throughout the United States, and for the
accomplishment of that purpose absorb the stock of other corpor-
ations, such 'corporations so absorbed have thenceforward but a
nominal existence; they cannot initiate or execute any independent
business policy, their elimination in this respect being -a prime
consideration for their absorption."
This statement seems to accord with well recognized authorities.
In every successful quo warranto proceeding the shareholders are
in fact punished for the sins of omission and commission of the
corporation. It has repeatedly been held that when the government
is complainant, and in many other cases, no hocus-pocus corporate
cloak, used as a shield to hoodwink the public, commit frauds,
violate the law, and reap the illegal benefits, can be successfully
relied on as a defense by the real offenders.11
8. The defendant had reserved the right "to present circumstances
which it could not introduce in evidence upon the trial in mitigation
of the penalty." The court offered, while the officers were present,
"to hear any evidence that might be submitted, tending to show
that neither the Indiana nor the New Jersey company had ever
11 State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 0. S. 137; People v. North Riv. Sug. Ref. Co., 121
N. Y. 582; Brundred v. Rice, 49 0. S. 640; Metcalf v. Arnold, iso Ala. x8o; Robinson
on Patents, § 912.
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before violated the Interstate Commerce Law." After a day or two
consideration and conference with the officers, the defendant's
counsel declined to present any witness upon the subject, choosing,
rather, to stand upon the law's presumption of innocence, saying
"for this defendant now to assert its innocence of matters that it is
not charged with, or attempt to show that it has been innocent of
any wrong-doing in connection with matters outside of this record,
when there is nothing before the court charging it with such wrong-
doing, would present a' situation unheard of in Anglo-Saxon juris-
prudence." The court said, however, that where the crime charged
is acceptance of preferential rates in violation of a law 2o years old,
during a period of 18 months, shipping 1,9oo cars at a rate of one-
third of that available to the general public, when its traffic affairs
are in charge of an. expert official, frequently visiting the freight
office of the railway, the rate being named in an unpublished special
billing order, settlement being made throtigh the auditor's office in
an unusual way, and where the defendant has persistently claimed
a constitutional right to make a private contract for such rate, he
was. unable to presume that the defendant was convicted of its virgin
offense.
Mr. Bishop says, the court, having discretion as to the punishment,
"will look into any evidence proper to influence a judicious magis-
trate to make it heavier or lighter," and may, after verdict by some
authorities, consider separate crimes not charged in the indictment,
dnd even hearsay has been allowed.' 2 The long series of public
investigations and official reports from 1884 to I9O6, upon the prac-
tices of the defendant, would almost justify judicial notice of the
fact this was not the first offense nor the sum of its offending, and
after ain opportunlity to show otherwise was given and declined,
justified the court's inference.
9. The defendant did not claim that the Elkins law in 'naming a
penalty of $I,00 to $20,ooo was unconstitutional, as fixing an
excessive fine or a cruel or unusual punishment, but did argue that
to hold it for 1,462 -offenses would violate the constitutional pro-
vision against the imposition of excessive fines. To this the court
says: "It is the view of the court that for the law to take from
one of its corporate creatures, as the penalty for the commission of
a dividend-producing crime, less than one-third of its net revenues
accrued during the period of its violation, falls far short of the
imposition of an excessive fine, and surely to do this would not be
the exercise of as much real power as is employed when sentence
is imposed taking from a human being one day of his liberty,"-and
12New Criminal Law, Vol. I, §§ 948, 950.
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especially so when the crime and revenues are so peculiarly and
intimately related.
By the weight of authority, constitutional provisions as to exces-
sive fines and cruel punishments are directed to legislative bodies
primarily, and fines within the limits fixed by the legislature are not
excessive, unless the law is first attacked and held to be nnconsti-
tutional. 13 "Cruel and unusual" means inhuman anC jarbarous. 14
A statute fixing $i,ooo-$io,ooo fines, for violating rate regulations,
is not uncoffstitutional.'s It is diffictlt to see upon what ground a
court can say a $2o,ooo fine is excessive if it is shown to be inflicted
for a deliberate and systematic violation of a law designed to protect
shippers throughout the United States.
The foregoing is an effort to set forth concisely and accurately
the issues raised and decided, in an opinion which reads as if it were
the studiously temperate production of an honest man, whose moral
sense has been so shocked by the situation developed as to make it
difficult to avoid using much harsher and more vigorous language.
The opinion provoked extensive comment, both favorable and
unfavorable.
After the decision, an.extraordinary pamphlet, "From the Direc-
tors of the Standard Oil Co. to its Enployes and Stockholders,"
was published and widely circulated, saying they desire "to empha-
size for the half-million people directly interested in its welfare, the
assurance of the company's absolute innocence of wrong-doing in
any of the prosecutions instituted against it in the Federal Courts ;"
the recent case "made notorious by the sensational fine of $29,240,-
ooo, is no case of rebate or discrimination but simply of the legality
of a freight rate, an open 6c rate, a rate used over three competing
railroads for from ten to fourteen years. The trial judge refused
to allow proof that the 6c rate had been filed by the C. & E. I., and
was therefore a legal rate. He refused to allow proof that linseed
oil was carried 'at 8c, and other bulk commodities as low as 5c. He
insisted that i8c was the only legal rate for oil, when no one had
ever paid it, and when it was authoritatively sworn it did not apply
to oil." It has been difficult to get a fair hearing "in a large portion
of the press, swayed alike by socialistic outcry from below and
political pregsure from above." In proof of the latter, it alleges
that the president!s messages and official reports were specially
timed to.advance legislation and influence decisions in matters affect-
ing the Standard Oil Co., and adds: "Thit our friends may know
13 Note z6 L. R. A. 561.
26 In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 446.
1Burlington, etc., Ry. v. Dey, 82 Ia. 312, 31 Am. St. R. 477.
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more fully how the truly independent are upholding right and
honesty, a few editorial comments are appended," following a
"statement of James A. Moffett, president, Standard Oil Co. of
Indiana." Among other things, Mr. Moffett says, "There is no
question of rebate or discrimination in this'case ;" the government
contends "that the lawful rate is 18c; the defendant claims, first,
that the lawful rate was 6c; and if 6c was not, it was the rate issued
to the Standard by the Alton as the lawful fate," and "it was justi-
fied in believing, from its own investigation, and from the informa-
tion received from the railroad company, that 6c was the lawful
rate;" "the I8c rate was a class and not a commodity rate," and the
chairman of the Traffic Association issuing it "testified that it was
never applied, and was never intended to apply to oil." "The rate
on oil between Chicago and East St. Louis, over the Alton, for
14 years,--189i to 19o5-was always 6c per ioo pounds; this was
an open, published rate, known to every one concerned in the ship-
ment of oil, and generally known in all railroad circles in Chicago."
"Both Chicago and East St. Louis being in Illinois, the railroad
company was under no legal obligation to file the rate with the
Commerce Commission; but Whiting being in Indiana, shipments
from Whiting to East St. Louis were, technically at least, inter-
state; and the Alton filed an application sheet applying to Whiting
the Chicago rates, and deemed the filing of the application sheet all
that was necessary under the law." He then recites the defendant's
offer to prove, and the court's refusal, to admit the evidence, that
the C. & E. I. rate on oil was 6c; and low commodity rates were
made on other products, such as mhalt and cornmeal, 7c; brick, 5c;
starch, peas, beans, .popcorn, linseed oil in tanks, 8c; "knowing that
the rate on the Eastern Illinois was but 6c; having no reason for
shipping over the Alton in preference to the Eastern Illinois, and
able to ship all of its oil over the latter road, we insist that the facts,
many of which the court did not permit us to show, not alone demon-
strate innocence, but inherently forbid the idea of guilt."
Then follow nearly thirty pages of editorial comments, mostly of
a scurrilous kind: the opinion "was a piece of judicial sensatiopalism,
as full of holes as an imported cheese;"
' 18 "playing to the gal-
leries ;,117 "clap-trap and farce,"18 and a "time of frenzied politics ;"19
"to advance the political and Chautauqua interests of Jumic
LANDIs ;"2 "venom and bias ;''21 "the outcome of the administra-
26 Denver Post.




21 Rochester Post Express.
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tion's campaign against great corporations, wise and necessary as
its early stages were, is the socialism of Karl Marks and Ferdinand
and LaSalle ;12 - "a peril to all investors ;-123 "a blow at enterprise ,
the evidence excluded "makes the case look like a persecutien ;'-'
"too much of the savor of the opera-.comique to be quite impres-
sive; -" 26 "something besides a high sense of justice and dignity
* * * urged the .court to its decidedly flamboyant declaration
* * * making so open a bid for the plaudits of the masses;"--
"what would happen if the Landis decision was enforced? Panic
and commercial ruin."2 s Other similar comments are given. It is
evident, trom a perusal of these editorial effusions, that the writers
had given much more attention to Mr. Moffett's statement than to
the Judge's opini6n, and seemed to be wholly ignorant of the con-
tents of Mr. Garfield's report; besides they wholly ignore, and fail
to mention, the fact that a jury of twelve men, sworn to render a
true verdict upon the facts before them, found the defendant guilty;
and an article in the North American Review, by Mr:-F. D. Pavey,
in September, 19o7, . similarly relies for its facts mainly on Mr.
Moffett's statement, and for its conclusion upon ignorance of Mr.
Garfield's report. As, for example, Mr. Moffett alleges the 6c
Alton rate was generally known in railroad circles in Chicago. In
answer to repeated inquiries by the Bureau of Corporations of the
station agents of these three roads, in and around Chicago, as to
,what the Rast St. Louis rate was upon oil, the -I8c rate was given
without exception. These agents also, at the junction stations, with
the exception of the C. B. & Q., billed the oil at higher rates.
Before one can form a reasonably fair conclusion of the propriety
and justice of the fine imposed by JUDGE LANDIS, it is necessary to
understand something more of the history of oil shipments by the
Standard Oil Co. from. its Whiting, Ind., refinery throughout the
country during the past 17 years, than appears in the opinion deliv-
ered by the Judge.. It is safe to assume that the government placed
before the court and jury such part of this history as it deemed
relevant out of the abundant material set forth in Mr. Garfield's
report of May 2, 19o6. Although the Standard'p pamphlet above
referred to calls Mr. Garfield's report "a tissue of old misrepresen-









28 Wall Street News.
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nor urged in court (so far as appears from the opinion), but whai
is set forth with fullness and fairness by Mr: Garfield, showing its
bearing upon, and its connection with what has been the most
abominable and iniquitous course of discrimination in favor of the
Standard for nearly twenty years in the history of railroad trans-
portation. It is also safe to assume that the statements made in this
pamphlet are as strong as the company can make in its own defence.
These statements, issued with all the air of injured innocence, when
considered in connection with other relevant facts exhibiting the
whole situation, instead of showing "absolute innocence" come
nearer showing "absolute guilt." The jury evidently got- at the
truth.
It is possible here to outline this history in connection with
Whiting alone, without referring to similar conditions existing else-
where throughout the country in favor of the Standard.
Whiting, Indiana, is two miles from the Illinois state line, and
seventeen miles from the center of Chicago, and is within the
Chiicago switching district. The Standard's refinery there was built
in 1889, and opened in 189o. It refines one-third of the oil sold by
that company in the United States, and it supplies oil to more than
half of the territory of the United States.29 The Standald has
refineries located in twelve different states, and in the central terri-
tory at Buffalo, N. Y., Franklin and Pittsburgh, Pa., Parkersburg,
W. Va., Cleveland and Lima, O.-3 At or near these places there are
competing refineries, as there are also at Findlay and Toledo, 0.,
Detroit, Chicago, Cincinnati, Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis
and a few other places in the central states.3'
In nearly all of this territory, preferential rates for the same
distances have been made to'the Standard from Whiting over inde-
pendent refineries.32 For example, over the Lake Shore road,
which reaches Toledo and Whiting, rates on oil from Whiting east-
ward were, until 1905, 4Yc for 42 miles; 5c for 69 and 84 miles; 8c
for x5 and 139 miles; 9c for 164 miles; while from Toledo west
they were 6y2c for 33 miles; 8 for 66 miles, Ioy4c for 112 miles;
I Ic for 134 miles; 12C for 149 miles.33 At the same time, the oil rate
from Whiting east was 2Y2c to 4c below the 5th class rate (the class
in which oil belongs, unless special rates are made), while from
Toledo west it was from Ic below to Ic above the 5th class rate.3'
29 Report, p. 21.
30 lb. 46.
11 Ib. 54, 179.
'Report, pp. 179-244 (Map. p. 179).
33 Ib. p 183.
"lIb. p. 183.
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Exactly similar conditions existed on the Pennsylvania road between
Pittsburg and Whiting, in favor of the latter place. 35 Like prefer-
ences were made -in Michigan; the rate from Whiting to Kalamazoo
(041 miles) was 8y 2c; from Toledo to Kalamazoo (136 miles) was
12c; while the fifth class rates were exactly the same.36
To Ohio river points the same preferences were given.31 Whiting
is very nearly the same distance (295 miles) from Cincinnati, Louis-
ville and Evansville, and the open rate on oil has been iic to each of
these places, though to Evansville there has been a secret rate of
8y c, and part of the time 6c.38 From Toledo to Cincinnati- (211
miles), the oil rate has been I.oc; and from Cleveland (244 miles)
ioY2 c,-whicht represent 95/iooc and 86/iooc per ton per mile from
these, places, as compared with 75/1ooc per ton per mile from
Whiting, the oil rate being 4c below 5th class from Whiting, and
only 2y2c below from Toledo. From Toledo to Evansville (382
miles) the oil rate has been i5c, 79/Iooc per ton per mile; while
from Whiting the secret rate was 8y4c, or 57/Iooc per ton per mile,
and part of the time lower yet.39
To East St. Louis, the secret rate of 6c from Whiting (282 miles
by the shortest route) has existed for nearly 17 years; the rate from
Toledo (431 miles) has been I7c, and from Cleveland I93c; the
fifth class rate from Whiting (according to the distance basis of
adjusting rates adopted by the Central Freight Association for this
territory) would .be I4y2c; from Toledo i8c.; or the oil rate from
Whiting is 8Y26 less, and from Toledo ic less than the 5th class
rate."
Again, prior to the opening of the Whiting refinery in 189o,
connecting railroads generally prorated on oil from eastern refineries
to the middle, the western and the southwestern states, so that the
through rate was less than the sum of the rates upon the separate
lines. This was discontinued as soon as the Whiting refinery was
opened, although it was continued upon nearly all other commodi-
ties. After this, the rate from the eastern refineries of i2c to 192c
to Chicago must be added to the rate from Chicago, making a large
increase over former prorating rates" So, also, after the Whiting
refinery was opened, the railroads refused to make through rates on
oil from points east of Whiting to the southwest, although they did
' Ib. p. x8S.
811b. pp. 19s, x98.
I b. p. 187 Map, p. 244).
SSIb. 187, 188 (Maps).
Ib. p. 188 et seq.
40Ib. p. 316, et seq. 345.
1 Ib. p. 21.
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on all other commodities of a similar grade. 2 The eastern refineries
had to pay from 17c to 24Y c per ioo pounds, or from iic to i872c
more than the Whiting secret rate to East St. Louis, the gateway
to the southwest. The foregoing indicate, with the exception of
the secret rates, advantages given to the Standard in the- open
adjustment of rates. They have been so complete, systematic and
continuous as to make it impossible to be merely fortuitous. 43
Still another method of manipulation of open rates working to
the same end, and resulting practically in secret or semi-secret rates,
was the scheme known as the Grand Junction combination.4" Grand
Junction is an obscure village of 4o0 inhabitants, 52 miles east of
Mermphis, Tennessee, and is the junction of the Illinois Central and
the Southern railways. For a long time, the Ohio river has been
made the basis of rates for shipments from north to south, or vice
versa, and prorating was not used upon oil or other commodities,
with very few exceptions. The local rate from the origin to the
Ohio river was added to the local rate, from there to the destination,
in order to make the through rate.45 Prior to 1896 the oil rate from
Whiting to the Ohio river was i2c, and after that iic; these rates
were published in comprehensive class and commodity tariffs for
years, by the Central Freight Association, representing all the roads
connecting Chicago and the Ohio river, including the Illinois Central
and the C. & E. I., and these were the rates filed with the Interstate
Commerce Commission." The L. & N. and the Southern are the
most important lines carrying freight from the river south, and for
years 'have published special oil tariffs from river points to points
further south reached by their lines. The Southern tariff expressly
states there are no rules or regulations affecting rates except those
filed with the Commerce Commission. The Southern does not reach
the Ohio river directly, but only over the Illinois Central from
Grand Junction. At the time it published its tariff, it issued a
division sheet (which was not filed with the Commission, nor posted
in its office for inspection, although a copy was given to the Stand-
ard, and no one else) showing what proportion of the published
rates should go to the Illinois Central from Evansville to Grand
Junction, and to the Southern from there to destination. This was
from 8c to I832c for the Illinois Central, depending upon desti-
nation, and making the proper public charge for oil from Whiting to
Grand Junction, over the Illinois Central, from i9c to 292c.47 As
2 Ib. p. 22.
"See Report, pp. 22-25.
4 Ib. pp. 248-274.
'1 lb. p. 247.
lb. pp. 248-9.
1 lb. pp. 249-50.
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a fact, however, for many years oil was carried for the Standard
from Whiting to Grand Junction at 13c; this was a secret rate until
1896, when "the Illinois Central filed with the Commission a tariff
reading from Riverdale to-Grand Junction, naming the 13c rate
when destined to points on the Southern, and saying "the above rate
will apply. from Whiting." Riverdale is the smaill junction crossing
of the Illinois Central and the belt line from Whiting, near Chicago.
The next year the C. & E. I. issued and filed a joint tariff naming
the same rate from Dolton, Ill., over its line, and the E. & T. H. and
the Illinois Central, they being parties thereto, applying also to
Whiting; the Illinois Central rate was soon afterward canceled.
4 8
These rates, conflicting with the generally published tariffs between
important points, and also with the well understood methods of
establishing rates between northern and southern points, and being
between such obscure points as Riverdale and Grand Junction, would
never occur in the ordinary course of business to the mind of any
shipper, were, though technically published by filing, practically
secret; and in fact when inquiry was made of the railroad agents as
to oil rates to southern points, the regularly published rates, based
on the Ohio river division, were named.40 This first C. & E. I. 13c
tariff has a memorandum upon it, saying it was "arranged with
Howard Page, Standard Oil Co.," who was then its general traffic
manager. 0 Its re-issue riext year bears memoranda to the effect
that the railroad company could re-issue it by consent of the Stand-
ard's traffic manager at Whiting. 58 He, in connection with the
C. & E. I. officers, as shown 'by their letters, arranged for blind
billing of the oil,-"From Standard Oil Co., Whiting to Grand
Junction, for beyond, weight 32,192 pounds, paid," showing no
rates nor amounts; the 13c rate, and the proper amounts were
inserted only after the way bills had reached the railroad freight
auditor's office. The Standard gave instructions direct to the rail-
road agent at Grand Junction as to the destination of the oil in each
car billed to the rubber-stamp-marked "Standard Oil Co., Grand
Junction, for beyond."-5 2  The result of this scheme was to make the
oil rate from Whiting to Atlanta, Ga. (shortest distance, 733 miles,
and via Grand Junction, 1,oo3 miles) 33.2c; and from Toledo (687
miles) 47Y2c. From Whiting to Chattanooga (595 miles, via
Grand Junction, 849 miles 25.9c; from Toledo (549 miles, 43c. The
classified rates on other similar commodities were less from Toledo
Ib. p. 251.
"I lb. pp. 268-9, 335, 336. 337.
Ib._p. 270.
51 Ib. P. 271.
Slb. p. 273.
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than from Whiting. The regularly published oil rate from Whiting
to Birmingham, Ala., was 44c, and was stated to be sb by Mr.
Archbold for the Standard Oil Co., in answer to a request of the
Industrial Commission in ioi; at that very time, however, the
above secret rate was in effect, making the rate then actually paid
on oil 29y2c from Whiting to Birmingham, instead of 44c, while
the Toledo rate was 47Y2c for I28-miles shorter haul.53
Still another device used for concealing the true rates charged
ha s been the so-called state rate. Whiting and Evansville are both
in. Indiana, but oil shipped between these places over the belt line
and the C. & E. I. passes across the Illinois line to Dolton, Ill., the
junction point of the two roads. However, the C. & E. I. treated
the traffic as intrastate instead of interstate, as has since been ruled by
the Supreme Court,"4 and made, in. 1892, an 8yjc rate from Whiting
to "Evansville (proper),"--this being the recognized way of indicat-
ing that the rate would not apply beyond; this was not filed with the
Commerce Commission, because, it was claimed not to be inter-
state.5 5 In 1897, this tariff was re-issued and "proper" was omitted,
and, as a memorandum from the railroad office showed, Mr. Page,
then the Standard's traffic mahager, "did not desire this rate filed
with I. C. C.," and "for that reason" we "make state tariffs." 56
These tariffs continued till discovered by Mr. Garfield in 1905, and
had been used constantly by the Standard on through shipments of
oil to the south beyond Evansville, in territory not reached from
Grand Junction. The duly. published rate to Evansville was i ic,
and the Standard's shipments were-so billed and consigned to places
beyond Evansville; the amounts at Iic were sent to the general
offices of the railroad company, which made collections at the 84c
rate upon collection bills showing the oil had been billed at iIc.
The Standard officers could not be ignorant of the difference between
the rate paid and the rate of billing.57
The same device was used in connection with the East St. Louis
rate. 8 In 1896 the C. B. & Q. issued a tariff on oil from Chicago
to Illinois points, not naming East St. Louis, but referring to a
special tariff for rates on oil to that point. This Chicago tariff was
not (nor was any special tariff) filed with the Commerce Commis-
= 1b. pp. 255, 258, 274.
54 Hanley v. Kans. C. R. Co., 187 U. S. 617. There was, under the holding in Lehigh
V. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania (1892), 145 U. S. 192, some reason to think this was intrastate
traffic, although no reason to call traffic between Whiting and East St. Louis such.
'z Report, p. 276.
I' lb. p. 277.
1 Ib. pp. 279-284.
a" Report, pp. 3x6-36-
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sion, because it was a state tariff, though the road applied the rates
to Whiting, Indiana. It was generally distributed among the road's
agents in the state and was published to that extent. This road was
the first to grant the 6c rate on oil from Chicago to East St. Louis,
which it did by a special billing order already explained; this was
not filed nor published, nor open to the inspection of the public.
In 1899, and subsequently, this company filed, along with the others,
with the Commerce Commission, the general Tariff No. 24 above
mentioned, indicating that the rate on oil from Chicago to East St.
Louis was i8c; in igoI, it filed an appliction sheet saying that
Chicago rates should apply from Whiting, but did not state what
these rates were. In 19o3 it issued and filed another tariff, stating
the rates contained in certain other tariffs specified by number should
apply between Chicago and East St. Louis; none of these contained
any special rate on oil; but an amendment, filed in i9o4, referred to
No. io59, which named a 6c rate on oil; this tariff was only referred
to, and the rate was not mentioned; the tariff Was not filed with the
Commission until h9o6, after Mr. Garfield's investigation 'was
made. 9 "
The Alton road was a party to Tariff No. 24 above, fixing the 18c
rate. In 1899, it issued a public state tariff on many commodities,
including oil, but naming no rate thereon from Chicago to East St.
Louis; in i9oo, however, it named a ioc rate on oil from Sumrhit,
a small junction point within the Chicago district, to East St. Louis,
and applied it to Whiting; this continued until 19o4, when it was
discontinued, and the i8c rate became the only published rate. None
of the state rates were filed with the Commerce Commission, though
applying to Whiting. 0 The history of the C. & E. I. East St. Louis
rate has already been given.61 All these secret and semi-secret rates
of these three roads were used to give the Standard advantage over
all competitors in the shipments of oil into the south and southwest.
And in addition to this, a combination similar to the Grand Junction
combination was made from the junction points near Chicago by
way of the secret rate to East St. Louis, through Springfield, Mo.,,
to enable the Standard to furnish oil to the far southwest in such a
way that no eastern refinery could compete at all.
2 Mr. Garfield
estimates that in the year 19o4 the Standard reaped, by these secret
rates, advantages amounting to nearly $24oooo on the East St. Louis
shipments alone over what competitors would have had to pay.
63
G' Ib; pp. 324-7, 339.
1' b. pp. 327-9, 333. 336.
1' Yb. p. 329, 334, 337.
Ib. pp. 360-65. 377-83.
1" Lb. p. 13.
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Whatever profits it made upon its oil by enjoying a monopoly
within this territory because of these rates, were in addition to this
amount, and due to this discrimination. In view of this history and
much other of a similar kind ad naruseum, the effort of the above
mentioned pamphlet to lay the blame upon a subordinate rate clerk
in the failroad office neither adds dignity nor credence to the claim.
It will be difficult for the defendant to conivince the public that there
has been a general conspiracy among subordinate railroad rate clerks
throughout the country for the past twenty years to persecute it by
forcing upon an unwilling and innocent beneficiary having expert
traffic managers, secret and discriminatory rates in its favor without
its consent and connivance.
Appeal or error will, of course, be prosecuted. Not being a capi-
tal crime, these can be taken directly to the Supreme Court only so
far as the record raises constitutional questions. The questions
passed upon in paragraphs 2 (with subdivisions), 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9,
are of this kind, and if the decision of that court is desired upon
them, it seems the appeal or writ of error must be taken directly to
that court, or they will be waived by going first to the Circuit Court
of Appeals, which will then have final jfirisdiction, unless some law
question is certified to the Supreme Court, or that court by certiorari
brings the whole case before itself for hearing.8 ' The final dispo-
sition of the case will be awaited with great interest.
H. L. WILGUS.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
11 See Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton Mills, x84 U. S. 295; Spencer v. Duplan Co.,
191 U. S. 526; Union Bank v. Memphis, 189 U. S. 71; Am. Sug. Ref. Co. v. New
Orleans, xS U. S. 280; Robinson v. Caldwell, r65 U. S. 359; Motes v. United States,
170 U. S. 458; Mure v. Arlington Hotel Co., z68 U. S. 430; Forsyth v. Hammond,
z66 U. S. So6.
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